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Abstract
Macroprudential policies, such as caps on loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, have
become part of the policy paradigm in emerging markets and advanced
countries alike. Given that housing is the most important asset in house-
hold portfolios, relaxing or tightening access to mortgages may affect the
distribution of household wealth in the country. In a stylised model we
show that the final level of wealth inequality depends on the size of the
LTV ratio, housing prices, credit cost and the strength of a bequest motive;
ultimately with no unequivocal effect of LTV ratios on wealth inequality.
These trade-offs are illustrated with estimations of “Gini Recentered In-
fluence Function” regressions on household survey data from 12 eurozone
countries that participated in the first wave of the Household Finance and
Consumption Survey (HFCS). The results show that, among the households
with active mortgages, high LTV ratios at the time of acquisition are related
to high contributions to wealth inequality today, while house price increases
are negatively related to inequality contributions. A proxy for the strength
of bequest motives tends to be negatively related with wealth inequality, but
credit cost does not show a significant link to the distribution of wealth.
Keywords: Household Finance, Macroprudential policy, Inequality, LTV
ratio, Wealth distribution
JEL classification:, D31, E5, E21, G21
Email addresses: jean-francois.carpantier@univ-amu.fr (Jean-Francois
Carpantier), javier.olivera@liser.lu (Javier Olivera), philippe.vankerm@liser.lu
(Philippe Van Kerm)
1. Introduction
Macroprudential policies, such as caps on loan-to-value (LTV), loan-to-
income (LTI), debt-service-to-income (DSTI) ratios, limits on credit growth
and other balance sheets restrictions, have become part of the policy paradigm
in emerging markets and advanced countries alike. National authorities with
explicit macroprudential mandate have been established in most EU coun-
tries under the auspices of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in
the last 3 years and the Capital Requirements Directive 2013/36/EU now
gives to the macroprudential authorities a new set of policy instruments to
address financial stability risks more effectively.
According to the Annual Report 2015 of the ESRB, published in July
2016, more than 130 new macroprudential measures were taken in the EU
in the course of 2015. As Claudio Borio presciently suggested in 2009, para-
phrasing Milton Friedman, “we are all macroprudentialists now”.
The empirical literature on the effectiveness of the newly activated macro-
prudential tools is growing and mainly assesses whether, and how much,
bank credit and house prices respond to the activation of the macropruden-
tial policies. See among others Cerutti et al. (2016) for a comprehensive
panel analysis of 119 countries over 2000-2013, Tressel and Zhang (2016)
for a Euro area perspective, Claessens et al. (2013) for a 48 countries panel
analysis based on bank-level data or Gross and Poblacion Garcia (2016) for
an analysis based on EU household survey data.
Despite these efforts, much remains to be studied. As pointed out by
Tressel and Zhang (2016) and Claessens (2014) little is known empirically
about their effectiveness in mitigating systemic risks, about their channel
of transmission and about the tools’ costs. Most empirical studies to date
have focused on the potential benefits of macroprudential policies, while
their potential costs have received less attention (exceptions include Behn
et al. (2016) and Arregui et al. (2013), which examine output losses resulting
from banks’ responses to higher capital requirements).
The objective of this paper is to bridge the literature on macroprudential
policy and the literature on wealth inequality. Stiglitz (2015) has already
noted that increases in the wealth-to-income ratio and in inequality are re-
lated to the increase in rents and in the value of land, and to the financial
system. He specifically shows that “a lowering of collateral requirements or
of banks’ capital adequacy requirements does not result in an increase in
the overall efficiency of the economy, but leads to more inequality.” In the
same vein, Galbraith (2012) argues that the rise in U.S. inequality is mainly
driven by financial and macroeconomic policy choices. More specifically, our
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paper examines the connection between macroprudential policy and wealth
inequality, both theoretically and empirically. It also brings specific inequal-
ity tools in the wider toolkit of the empirical literature on macroprudential
policy effectiveness.
Looking at the impact of macroprudential policies on inequality matters,
and is not disconnected of policy makers’ concerns. Macroprudential poli-
cies are widely known to have redistributive effects. Policy makers illustrate
this concern when they modulate LTVs caps, as is the case in Ireland where
the central bank has imposed a 90% cap for first-time-buyers of properties
up to EUR220,000 and of 80% otherwise. By documenting the impact of
macroprudential policies on inequality, our paper is also designed to pro-
vide some indirect guidance on inequality-mitigating devices such as the
one implemented in Ireland.
We first present a model able to highlight the main trade-offs and links
between credit market, housing market and household wealth inequality in
the society. We specifically show the links between LTV ratios, house prices,
cost of financing and bequest motives. We then explore the effects of LTV
ratios on ‘within generations’ inequality by means of simulations. We show
that LTV ratios have a non-monotonic effect on wealth inequality, that the
intensity of inter-generational transfers is key in determining the relationship
between LTV policies and wealth inequality and that a higher cost of credit
associated to loose LTV policies can reduce wealth inequality.
We then implement the so-called “Gini recentered influence function”
(Gini-RIF) regressions (see Firpo et al. (2009) and Choe and Van Kerm
(2014)) to assess the relationship of LTV ratios and other covariates on net
wealth inequality. The empirical work relies on the Eurosystem Household
Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) dataset, which is a harmonized
household survey initiated and coordinated by the European Central Bank.
The survey includes a large set of core questions inquiring about assets,
debt, income, bequests and demographics of the household.
The main contributions of this paper are the following. First, we provide
a unique assessment of the impact of macroprudential policies (limited in
this paper to the specific LTV tool) on inequality. Second, this paper is
one of the few exploiting household-level dataset to assess macroprudential
policies (the only other one we know is Ampudia et al. (2014) who specifi-
cally assess the impact of macroprudential policies on the loss given default
(LGD) of households). Third, we bring some analytical tools utilized in the
empirical literature of income distribution to study some macroprudential
policy variables and their (unintended) effects on wealth inequality.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the lit-
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erature on macroprudential policy effectiveness and its side effects. Section
3 presents the model and the simulations designed to illustrate the links be-
tween LTV ratios and inequality. Section 4 presents the Household Finance
and Consumption Survey data, outlines the econometric approach and in-
terprets the results. Section 5 concludes and discusses potential extensions.
2. Review of literature
The literature on the effectiveness of macroprudential tools is growing
fast. The most comprehensive analysis so far is by Cerutti et al. (2016)
for a panel analysis of 119 countries over 2000-2013. Their main finding is
that the activation of macroprudential policies is generally associated with
lower growth in credit and that this relationship is weaker in financially
more developed and open economies. They also find that the effectiveness
of macroprudential policies depends on the financial cycle, and that they
work less well in busts (also see McDonald (2015)).
Other key empirical references include Kuttner and Shim (2013) who
perform panel regressions over 57 countries and three decades and find that
housing credit growth is significantly affected by changes in the maximum
debt-service-to-income ratio, the maximum LTV ratio and limits on expo-
sure to the housing sector. Vandenbussche et al. (2012) study Central, East-
ern and South-Eastern Europe, known to have used a rich set of prudential
instruments over the last decades. Their evidence suggests that the most
effective measures were changes in the minimum capital adequacy ratio and
non-standard liquidity measures (marginal reserve requirements on foreign
funding, marginal reserve requirements linked to credit growth). Using data
from 49 countries, Lim et al. (2011) evaluate the effectiveness of macropru-
dential instruments in reducing systemic risk over time and across institu-
tions and markets. Their analysis suggests that tightened LTV and debt-to-
income ratios, reserve requirements, dynamic provisioning and ceilings on
credit growth (also in foreign currency) all seem to reduce the pro-cyclicality
of credit growth. Claessens et al. (2013) take an alternative approach and
analyze how changes in balance sheets of some 2,800 banks in 48 countries
from 2000 to 2010 respond to specific macroprudential policies. They find
that measures aimed at borrowers (caps on debt-to-income and LTV ratios)
and at financial institutions (limits on credit growth and foreign currency
lending) are effective in reducing asset growth.
Beside the panel analyses, country-specific analyses are now growing
abundant for the U.S. (Berger and Bouwman, 2013, Carlson et al., 2013),
Hong-Kong (Craig and Hua, 2011), Spain (Jimenez et al., 2013), the U.K.
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(Aiyar et al., 2012), Korea (Igan and Kang, 2011), Ireland (Kelly et al.,
2015) the Netherlands (Verbruggen et al., 2015) and France (Dietsch and
Welter-Nicol, 2014, Avouyi-Dovi et al., 2014). Two preliminary conclusions
emerge from these empirical studies. First, macroprudential policies are
generally found to have an impact on credit growth, but less effectively on
price dynamics. Second, most papers are mainly concerned by the benefits
(lower probability and impact of financial crises) of macroprudential policies,
and less by their costs.
Some references take the costs into consideration. Behn et al. (2016)
investigate the effects of policy-induced shocks to banking sector capitaliza-
tion on the probability of future banking crises while accounting for potential
endogenous responses that higher banking sector capitalization may imply
for macro-financial variables. Their model integrates the costs, understood
in terms of output losses that might result from banks responses to higher
capital requirements. Similarly, Arregui et al. (2013)) propose a “cookbook”
to evaluate the net benefits of macroprudential policy, with the costs defined
as arising from an increase in the cost of intermediation and its effect on
long-run output.
Still, inequality, a very specific cost not directly captured by output
losses, is widely overlooked as a potential collateral damage of macropruden-
tial policies. Along with Stiglitz (2015)—cited above—who demonstrated
that lower collateral requirement “does not result in an increase in the overall
efficiency of the economy, but leads to more inequality”, some recent papers
challenge the view that the distribution of income and wealth is irrelevant to
macroeconomic stability. According to the study of Perugini et al. (2016) on
inequality, credit and the financial crisis, policy makers should cast the net
wider than monetary policy and regulatory reforms and consider the effects
of changes to distributive patterns. Social impacts are examined by Ampu-
dia et al. (2014) who study how caps on the LTV ratio affect the loss given
default of the households, and more generally the household distress in case
of crisis. To our knowledge, this paper and ours are, so far, the first ones to
exploit the household-level data from the HFCS for macroprudential policy
effectiveness analyses. Igan and Kang (2011) propose an extension where
they utilize information on individual households using a national survey on
mortgages and housing demand conducted annually by the central bank of
South Korea. We finally note that the national studies often rely on loan-
level national databases such as Dietsch and Welter-Nicol (2014) and Kelly
et al. (2015).
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3. Wealth inequality and Loan-To-Value ratios in an overlapping
generations model
We first build a simple overlapping generations (OLG) model to show
how LTV ratios can affect wealth inequality (see Deaton and Laroque (2001)
and Gary-Bobo and Nur (2015) for similar modelling approaches). The
model is designed to highlight the links between LTV ratios, house prices,
cost of financing and willingness of inter-generational transfers (so-called be-
quest motives). We then utilize a inequality index able to take into account
for ‘within generations’ inequality (Shorrocks (1980)). The use of a OLG
is motivated by its clear mechanisms of accumulation and transmission of
wealth between generations and because it offers the possibility to account
for life-cycle effects on the accumulation of wealth. This is particularly im-
portant in the estimation of wealth inequality as the distribution of wealth
in the society is significantly affected by where the individuals stand along
the life-span. We finally derive comparative statics in view to see how LTV
ratios affect inequality, and how this relationship is affected by the cost of
credit and bequest motives.
3.1. An OLG model
We consider a stylised economy where individuals live for two periods.
The first period of life comprises the full length of the active life (early
and mid adulthood) in which the individual chooses consumption and the
quantity of housing to be acquired. Consumption and housing are financed
out of a bank loan and an anticipated bequest given at the beginning of
the first period. There are not unintentional bequests. For brevity, we
abstract from any other form of saving different of housing and other source
of income. The loan is taken at the beginning of the first period and paid
back in full at the beginning of the second period. The bank lends a share
θ of the house market value and charges an interest rate equal to r.
The second period of life corresponds to old age where the individual
chooses consumption and the bequest given to the children. Consumption
in the second period is financed out of the updated value of the house—which
is the only way to finance inter-temporal consumption—and after repaying
the loan and leaving a bequest to the child.
There is no specific amenity associated with a house. The house appears
in the utility function due to the resources it provides in the future. The
house is described by housing units and by a price per unit. Without loss
of generality, the housing units can also be interpreted as quality measures.
It is assumed that each old agent will have only one child.
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The loan-to-value ratio (θ in the model) is a parameter that indicates
the ratio of the loan over the value of the house. As this ratio is generally
lower than one, then 1−θ is the down-payment required by the bank. In this
setting, all adults borrow as much as they can to buy the biggest possible
house, and therefore the saving can be seen as the down-payment, and the
loan as the maximum amount that a bank accepts to lend. Such situation
occurs in countries where house price expectations are high, or where the
demand is highly elastic compared to the supply. These are precisely the
cases that we want to capture since these are the cases where housing prices
are affected by credit supply and where specific wealth inequality issues
arise. Similarly, Bover (2016) argue that an increase in the regulatory LTV
ratio can be modelled as an increase in the demand of credit.
Although house prices are typically endogenous and affected by the credit
supply, our model treats prices as exogenous. This might be criticized as a
situation where the LTV is fixed (in other words where agents all borrow
as much as the banks allow), but at least this choice allows to simplify the
identification of the channels by which LTV affect wealth inequality.
The consumption restrictions of adult and old individuals are the follow-
ing:
bt +Htptθ = c1,t +Htpt (1)
Htpt+1 = c2,t+1 +Htptθ(1 + r) + bt+1 (2)
where c1,t and c2,t+1 are first period consumption in adulthood and sec-
ond period consumption when old, bt is the bequest received in t, Ht is the
housing units, pt is the price per housing unit in t, θ is the LTV, r is the
interest rate on the bank loan. Furthermore, in this setting bt ≥ 0 for all t
(no Ponzi game). Individuals derive utility from consumption in both peri-
ods and from the ‘joy of giving’ motive (Abel and Warshawsky (1988)) of
leaving a bequest bt+1 to their children. The utility function of an individual
born at time t is:
Ut = ln(c1,t) + β ln(c2,t+1) + γ ln(bt+1) (3)
The optimal values for Ht and bt+1 are obtained from the maximization
of the utility function subject to both consumption restrictions, and the
growth of prices is assumed constant (pt+1pt = 1 + pi). The optimal values
are:
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Ht =
β + γ
(1 + β + γ)pt(1− θ)(bt) (4)
bt+1 =
γ(1 + pi − θ(1 + r))
(1 + β + γ)(1− θ) (bt) (5)
It is easy to observe that dHtpt/dθ > 0 and dHtpt+1/dpi > 0, but for the
bequest: dbt+1/dθ > 0 if pi − r > 0.
3.2. Wealth inequality
Although we are aware of the challenges in the conceptualization and
measurement of wealth inequality (a recent survey is Cowell and Van Kerm
(2015)) we need an operational definition to be able to track changes in the
wealth stock of the two types of agents overlapping in one period in our
model. We will look at any period t + 1 where the adult and the old indi-
viduals overlap and focus on inequality between and within generations:
wealth in adulthood: W1,t+1 = W1
wealth in old age: W2,t+1 = W2
Measuring inequality at the very beginning of t + 1 means that we are
only considering the initial wealth of the adult (the bequest received) and
the house of the old. In contrast, if we consider the very end of period
t+ 1, the adult would have a house, but the old will have zero wealth (there
are not accidental bequests). So, in order to circumvent this limitation, we
define net wealth for each agent as the market value of the house minus
credit debt in t+ 1.
W1 = Ht+1pt+1 −Ht+1pt+1θ(1 + r) (6)
W1 =
(β + γ)γ(1 + pi − θ(1 + r))(1− θ(1 + r))
(1− θ)2(1 + β + γ)2 (bt) (7)
W2 = Ht+1pt+1 −Htptθ(1 + r) (8)
W2 =
(β + γ)(1 + pi − θ(1 + r))
(1− θ)(1 + β + γ) (bt) (9)
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The population n in t+1 is composed of n1 adults and n2 old individuals,
with n = n1 + n2. Wealth of each agent i is:
W1i = α1bit , with α1 =
(β + γ)γ(1 + pi − θ(1 + r))(1− θ(1 + r))
(1− θ)2(1 + β + γ)2 (10)
W2i = α2bit , with α2 =
(β + γ)(1 + pi − θ(1 + r))
(1− θ)(1 + β + γ) (11)
Equations (10) and (11) indicate that wealth observed in t + 1 for the
adult and old generation is a function of the bequests received in period t.
This setting allows to find closed form solutions for some inequality mea-
sures. Wealth inequality is measured for the total population n, and given
that this can be subdivided in two groups, we use an inequality index that
can be additively decomposed by groups with desirable properties. This is
the case of the generalized entropy family of indices (Bourguignon (1979),
Cowell (1980), Shorrocks (1980)).
Ie(W ) =
1
n
1
e(e− 1)
n∑
1
[(
Wi
µ
)e − 1] with e 6= 0, 1 (12)
The popular Theil index of entropy is obtained with e = 1 and the mean
log deviation is the limiting case with e = 0. For being able to find closed
solutions, we will use I2, that is equivalent to half the squared coefficient of
variation:
I2(W ) =
1
2n
n∑
1
[(
Wi
µ
)2 − 1] (13)
For a partition of the population into two distinct subgroups—here the
two generations alive at any time t—generalized entropy measures can be de-
composed into a component measuring within-group inequality (Iw) and an-
other component measuring between-group inequality (Ib): I2(W ) = Ib+Iw.
The between group component captures differences in average wealth be-
tween the two groups. The within group component is a population and
wealth weighted average of inequality within the groups. We focus on the
within component. The reason is that this metric is not affected by in-
equality arising from comparing the group of adult individuals with that
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of old individuals. Inter-generational inequality is significantly affected by
life-cycle effects, i.e. by the position of the individual in the life-cycle. Our
main purpose is to highlight the effects of macroprudential policy on the
distribution of wealth within the same generation of individuals. Given the
younger individuals need to finance out down-payments due to binding LTV
caps, the OLG framework allows to include parental bequest transfers that
will be used to pay these down-payments and consumption. Thus, though
we need to make explicit this transmission mechanism from the old to the
young, measuring wealth differences between both generations is not our
primary focus.
We insert equations (10) and (11) into equation (13). The population of
adults (n1) is always equal to that of old individuals (n2), i.e. each individual
has one child, which is a consequence of no including fertility decisions in the
model. We obtain the following expression for the within inequality index:
Iw =
α21 + α
2
2
(α1 + α2)2
A1 ,with A1 =
1
n
m∑
1
[
b2i − b¯2
(
∑m
1 bi)
2
] > 0 (14)
Where n1 = n2 = m = n/2. The expression A1 must be positive because
parents cannot transmit debts to children. In addition, A1 was determined
in period t and hence this is taken as a constant in period t+1, which is our
period of evaluation for wealth inequality. Therefore, A1 will be treated as a
constant in the comparative statics performed in t+1. In short, the source of
heterogeneity in this model is the distribution of bequest amounts received
by the adult individuals, which will allow them to accumulate different values
of wealth through the acquisition of housing. Interestingly, the term A1
somewhat captures this distribution of bequests for the adults.
3.3. Comparative statics
We study the effects of changes in LTV and other parameters on wealth
inequality. It is easy to see that
dIw
dθ
=
(1 + β)(1− θ) + rθγ
((1 + β + 2γ)(1− θ)− rθγ)3 2rγ(1 + β + γ)A1 (15)
And therefore,
Sign[
dIw
dθ
] = Sign[(1 + β + 2γ)(1− θ)− rθγ] (16)
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dIw
dθ will tend to be positive for large values of θ or γ. However, this
derivative can become negative if both interest rate r and the joy of giving
γ are large enough. The following expression shows the relationship be-
tween the parameter values that will assure dIwdθ > 0, meaning that wealth
inequality will increase with ’easy’ credit:
r <
(1 + β + 2γ)(1− θ)
θγ
(17)
Wealth inequality will decrease with ‘easy’ credit dIwdθ < 0 if:
r >
(1 + β + 2γ)(1− θ)
θγ
(18)
Figure 1 shows, by means of simulations, in which cases the effect of
a change in θ on wealth inequality is positive or negative. The first panel
(Figure 1(a)) reports the effects on inequality by LTV ratio and mortgage
cost. All the combinations of these values falling on the dark shaded area
indicate a negative effect of LTV ratio on inequality, while the combinations
falling on the light shaded area indicate a positive effect of LTV ratio on
inequality. For example, for a given value r = 0.33 (which is the total
financial cost of a mortgage of 30 years with a yearly interest rate of 2%) we
observe that a rise in the LTV ratio increases wealth inequality up to the
LTV is about 0.92, but then the effect becomes negative for larger values
of LTV. So, easy credit can have positive effects in the reduction of wealth
inequality only if the LTV is sufficiently large. Furthermore, larger values of
r increase the number of cases where a rise of LTV ratio can reduce wealth
inequality. So, when the cost of credit is high enough, easy credit can reduce
wealth inequality. Richer individuals (in our case, the individuals with larger
bequests) can benefit more from loose credit to acquire more housing, and in
this way, increase wealth inequality. But, a high financial cost will neutralize
or reverse this impact.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
Figure 1(b) shows that the intensity of the bequest motive is important
in determining the relationship between easy credit and wealth inequality.
Similar to before, Figure 1(b) shows the direction of the effect of a change
in θ on wealth inequality by LTV ratio and the strength of the bequest mo-
tive. The combinations of LTV ratios and values of bequest motive falling
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on the dark (light) shaded area indicate a negative (positive) effect of LTV
ratio on inequality. In general, it is more likely to observe a reduction in
wealth inequality due to an increase in the LTV ratio when the intensity of
the bequest motive is higher. Therefore, it is important to investigate the
strength of the bequest motive in order to better assess the relationship be-
tween credit and wealth inequality. In a similar vein, some studies in wealth
taxation have pointed out that much more must be done to understand what
is the incidence of bequest motives because the responses to estate taxation
crucially depend on these motives (Kopczuk (2013), Pestieau and Thibault
(2012), Cremer and Pestieau (2011) and Cigno et al. (2011)).
4. Wealth inequality and Loan-to-Value in the Household Finance
and Consumption Survey
Our theoretical model suggests that the relationship between wealth in-
equality and LTV regulations is ambiguous, even in a very simple model. In
this Section, we exploit the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consump-
tion Survey (HFCS) to provide empirical evidence about how LTV ratios
are related to wealth inequality.
We first present the HFCS data and describe the variables used in the
empirical exercise. We then present ‘Gini recentered influence function re-
gressions’ to illustrate the empirical relationship between levels of LTV ra-
tios and households contributions to wealth inequality in twelve eurozone
countries.
Our analysis here is avowedly descriptive. The results shed light on
how much LTV ratios and other covariates highlighted in our model are
related to observed wealth inequality in our data. Identification of a causal
relationship between LTV ratios (or regulations affecting LTV ratios) and
wealth inequality is beyond the scope of the analysis. For example, we
cannot capture the impact of LTV ratio caps on affordability of housing; that
is, we cannot see the impact on inequality of mortgages not taken because
of LTV restrictions.1 Causal analysis would require exogenous variations
that are not available in the sort of cross-section sample that we are able
to examine to date. However, at the very least, the analysis illustrates how
income distribution methods can be applied to macroprudential policy issues
at the household level and reveals a robust and relatively strong empirical
association between LTV ratios and wealth inequality.
1In other words, we examine variation of LTV ratios at the ‘intensive’ margin rather
than at the ‘extensive’ margin.
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4.1. The data
The Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) is
a harmonized household survey initiated and coordinated by the European
Central Bank. The survey has been implemented in all eurozone countries.
It is nationally representative of the resident household population in each
participating country. It includes a large set of core questions inquiring
about assets, debt, income and demographics of the household and some
country-specific questions. The HFCS resembles the US Survey of Consumer
Finances, which is considered the gold standard for household surveys on
wealth. See European Central Bank (2014) for details. Two waves of HFCS
data have been collected around 2010 and 2014 (but only the first wave was
available at the time of preparing this paper).
Although the first wave of HFCS is available in 15 countries, we only use
12 countries. Finland and France are excluded from our analysis because
they do not have information on key variables (such as the means of acqui-
sition of the house of main residence), and Slovenia is left out because of its
small sample size.
The population of households is divided into two distinct ‘generations’:
adult households aged 25–59 and old households aged 60–84. Regression
analysis of the relationship of LTV ratios and other variables with wealth
inequality is performed on the sample of adult households. The age and
other demographic characteristics are drawn from the ‘reference’ person in
the household, which is identified in the HFCS as the person who is at the
centre of the household’s finances. The initial sample size consists of 20,477
households from 12 countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Spain,
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal and Slovakia.
Our main variable of interest for the distributional analysis is house-
hold net worth which is the value of total assets (excluding public and
private occupational pension entitlements) minus household’s total liabil-
ities. Household net worth is the concept most commonly used for wealth
inequality analysis. As an alternative, we also compute a variable of ‘net
housing wealth’, which is the current self-reported value of the household
main residence (HMR) minus the outstanding balance of the corresponding
mortgage. This variable only measures the wealth that is related to housing,
a significant part of wealth for the majority of households (see, e.g., Bover
et al., 2016, Cowell and Van Kerm, 2015).2
2Missing data in the HFCS data have been multiply imputed by the data providers. In
all our analyses we repeat estimations on each of the five completed data replicates and
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Table 1 shows various summary measures about the distribution of net
worth in each of our national samples for households aged 25–59. Table
2 provides corresponding statistics for households aged 60–84. These sum-
mary statistics reveal large cross-country differences in the level of net worth
inequality. The Gini coefficient for example ranges between 0.46 (in Slo-
vakia) and 0.78 (in Germany) among ‘young’ households and between 0.40
(in Slovakia) and 0.70 (in Austria) among ‘old’ households. In all countries,
inequality is lower in ‘old’ households than in ‘young’ households, but the
levels are not systematically lower among young households. Note that, in
line with much of the literature on wealth inequality, we examine the dis-
tribution across households, not across individuals, and do not apply any
equivalence scale adjustment to account for household size and composition
(Cowell and Van Kerm, 2015).
INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE
On the other side of the equation, we examine the role of the LTV
ratio of the mortgage obtained by households, a measure similar to θ in
the theoretical model. We focus on loans obtained to finance acquisition of
the household main residence (which has been collateralised for obtaining a
mortgage). The LTV ratio—LTV for short—is obtained as the ratio between
the amount of the loan and the value of the house at the time of acquisition
of the property. This information is only reported by households with an
outstanding balance on a mortgage. No LTV is defined for households not
owning their main residence, households who have repaid their loans and
households owning their homes through inheritance, gifts, or ex-ante savings.
On average, the LTV is 0.77 for all countries, and about 13% of house-
holds have a LTV larger than 1.3 Tables 1 and 2 indicate that there are
however large country differences. For example, in the Netherlands, 14% of
households aged 25–59 have a LTV equal to 1, 37% have and LTV larger
than 1 and the average LTV is 0.88, while in Austria the LTV mean is
0.58 and only 7% of households have an LTV larger than 1. In almost all
countries, young households have larger average LTV than old households.
Table 3 shows how net worth varies according to the presence and age
of the mortgage and their LTV (among young households). Unsurprisingly,
the current wealth of households with older mortgages is generally higher
report average estimates, as prescribed, e.g., in Reiter (2003).
3The LTV values that are unlikely to be realistic (larger than 2) were recoded as missing
(in few cases, they were larger than 2)
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than that of households with younger mortgages. This reflects both an age
effect (young mortgages are generally held by younger households among
our group of ‘young’ households) and the fact that a larger share of the
mortgage has been repaid for older mortgages so household liabilities are
generally lower and net worth correspondingly higher. Households with low
LTV (conditionally on the age of the mortgage) generally have higher net
worth. This holds for houses acquired up to 5 years ago (that is, after
approximately 2005), but also for houses acquired more than 10 years ago
(before, approximately, 2000). For mortgages contracted between 2000 and
2005 approximately, the relationship is much less clear.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
The association between the LTV on a mortgage contracted in the past
and current net worth can arise from various causes. A low LTV ratio on a
mortgage may be explained by credit constraints to the households—itself
either imposed by regulatory policies, or by discretionary risk assessments
of the banks. This is the context considered in our theoretical model and
is likely to be more realistic for relatively ‘poor’ households (at the time
the loan is taken) who are not able to offer enough collateral guarantees,
and in countries with stronger macroprudential regulations. But a low LTV
ratio may also reflect household preferences, in which case the decision to
borrow less than the value of the asset is not constrained and the LTV
ratio does not reflect credit constraints. This is more likely to happen for
relatively ‘rich’ households that are able to bring in large downpayments
and prefer to reduce interest rate payments on mortgages. This is also likely
to happen when interest rates are high at the time the loan is taken. We
therefore expect the income and wealth position of households at the time
of taking the loan to be an important determinant of the observed LTV, and
this association also contributes to the association that we observe between
current wealth and LTV.
Unfortunately the HFCS data do not contain information about past
wealth and incomes that we can use as a control in our regressions. One
should therefore not interpret the relationship between LTV and current
wealth that we illustrate as a causal effect of past credit constraints too
naively. To mitigate this problem, our regression analysis includes variables
that attempt to absorb some of the variations in past wealth positions, such
as human capital, in addition to other variables such as age, sex, household
gross income, and its square, and dummies of year periods of the acquisition
of the household main residence.
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Other variables entering the theoretical model are the interest rate, the
bequest motive and house price variations. These can also be assessed em-
pirically in the HFCS. We measure the financial cost of the loan (similar to
r in the theoretical model) by the percentage of the principal that must be
paid at the end of the mortgage. Construction of this variable combines in-
formation on annual interest rates, principal and duration of the mortgage.4
However, some households in Belgium, Cyprus, Italy, the Netherlands, Por-
tugal and Slovakia present missing information on interest rates. This is
mostly problematic in Italy and Portugal, where 47% and 34% of households
with LTV information do not have information on interest rates. Economet-
ric results employing the financial cost of the loan in those countries must
be taken with caution.
The strength of the bequest motive is more difficult to capture. As an in-
dicator of the motives of the old generations, we create for young households
a dummy variable indicating whether the household has received a substan-
tial gift or inheritance or expects to receive it in the future. Note that
Spanish households do not have information on bequest expectations, while
Italian households lack information on both received and expected bequests.
Therefore, the role of bequest is not analysed in Italy, while the econometric
results for Spain are not perfectly comparable with other countries.
Finally, house price variations are computed as the average yearly vari-
ation between the value of acquisition of the HMR and the current value
reported by the household.
4.2. LTV and inequality: Gini recentered influence function regressions
Descriptive statistics suggest that low LTV are associated with high
net worth, even conditionally on the age of the mortgage. To examine
the implications of this observation for wealth inequality, we explore “Gini
recentered influence function” (Gini-RIF) regressions (Firpo et al., 2009,
Choe and Van Kerm, 2014).
Gini-RIF regressions consist of two stages. First, we calculate the “influ-
ence” on the net wealth Gini coefficient of each household in our samples as
a function of their net wealth and of the distribution of net wealth in their
country—this is the influence function calculation (Hampel, 1974). Intu-
itively, households in the tails of the distribution of net wealth have positive
4The interest rate of the mortgage corresponds to the current interest rate on the loan
reported by the individual, which is either the current fixed interest rate or the current
adjustable interest rate resulting from the most recent rate fixation
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influence on inequality—all else equal, more of them will tend to increase
the Gini coefficient—whereas households in the middle of the distribution
will have negative influence—more of them will tend to reduce the Gini co-
efficient. Second, we regress households’ “influence” on the Gini on various
household characteristics in order to see what are the important drivers of
households contributions to inequality. Formally, the regression coefficients
tell us how the Gini coefficient would respond to an infinitesimal shift in
the distribution of a regressor, holding the distribution of other covariates
constant (Firpo et al., 2009).
By including LTV as a regressor (along with other covariates), we can as-
sess whether the LTV of household’s mortgages is associated to their present
contribution to inequality. A positive coefficient for LTV would indicate that
higher LTV tends to increase (future) net wealth inequality: that is, house-
holds that can finance the acquisition of their main residence through larger
borrowing—notably, because of easier access to credit—tend to have (fu-
ture) net wealth levels in the segments of the net wealth distribution that
have positive influence on the Gini coefficient.
The key limitation discussed above remain however: one should interpret
this association carefully as it does not necessarily represent a causal effect
of credit constraints on future net worth, but also captures heterogeneity
in household preferences and initial wealth positions. Also, remember this
approach only examines the role of LTV at the ‘intensive margin’. Tight
access to credit can also lead to mortgages not being granted altogether and
this is not captured by the regressions.
More formally, let ν(F ) be the inequality functional of interest calculated
over the distribution F of a random variable y (here the net worth distri-
bution among ‘young households’). Our functional of interest is the Gini
index. The influence function of ν is a function of y and F and is defined
as:
IF(y; ν, F ) = lim
→0
ν((1− )F + ∆y)− ν(F )

(19)
The IF captures the effect on ν(F ) of an infinitesimal ‘contamination’
of F at point mass y. Expressions for IF(y; ν, F ) can be derived using
differential calculus and have been published for a wide range of statistics;
see, for example, Essama-Nssah and Lambert (2012) for a catalogue of IFs
relevant to income distribution analysis. The IF for the Gini coefficient is
given, for example, in Cowell and Flachaire (2007). To fix ideas, Figure 2
shows the influence function for the Gini coefficient of Germany estimated
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in our HFCS data. The figure is a plot of IˆF(yi; ν, Fˆ ) against net worth yi
for each household in the sample.
Households with net worth below 41,300 euros or above 1’132,750 euros
tend to influence inequality positively: if the number of households with
such net worth were to increase infinitesimally, the Gini coefficient would
increase. Conversely households with net worth between those values tend
to decrease the Gini with the maximum reduction achieved for households
with the average net worth. The illustration is for Germany but the shape of
the function is similar across countries—although thresholds and curvature
varies with the underlying distribution of net worth.
Figure 2, apart from showing the IF estimated for all households, shows
the IF of three distinctive groups of households: home owners with active
mortgages, home owners without active mortgages (the house is fully owned)
and non home owners. In general, households owning a house without ac-
tive mortgages are the richest, followed by owners with active mortgages
and then households that are non-owners. This translates in non-owners
having the largest influence on overall wealth inequality. For example, in
Germany, the IF mean is 0.88 for non-owners, 0.70 for home owners without
active mortgages and 0.57 for the owners with active mortgages. This shows
that contributions to inequality are not simply picking which households are
richest.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
RIF regression consists in regressing RˆIF(yi; ν, Fˆ ) = IˆF(yi; ν, Fˆ ) − ν(Fˆ )
on LTV and a set of additional controls. Note that regression analysis is
focused on investigating the effects of LTV on wealth inequality only among
households for whom the LTV exists, i.e. the group of households with active
mortgages.
The relationship between the regression coefficients and Gini coefficient
relies on a linear approximation and the magnitude of the coefficient is to
be interpreted for marginal changes in the LTV from the observed situation.
To help interpretation, we also report regression coefficients divided by 100
and expressed as a fraction of the Gini coefficient so that the magnitude
obtained is an approximation of the percentage change in the Gini for a one
percentage point increase in LTV (holding other regressors constant).
4.3. Results
Tables 4 to 7 show our Gini RIF regression results. The model specifi-
cations always include as regressors LTV ratio and a set of control variables
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(sex, age, education, gross income and its square and period of HMR acqui-
sition). Alternative specifications add, one by one, other covariates drawn
from the theoretical discussion. Control variables are included because the
access to a mortgage and its conditions can be determined by the age and
socio-economic status of households. We only report the coefficients on
LTV ratios and other covariates related to credit and housing conditions.
The complete econometric results of the control variables are available upon
request.
Table 4 shows that LTV has a positive contribution to wealth inequality
in all 12 countries. The sign of the effect is consistent across countries,
although it is not statistically significant in the Netherlands, Portugal and
Austria. The greater the LTV on a household’s mortgage, the greater is the
household’s contribution to inequality of current net wealth. Regressions
allowing the effect of LTV to vary by net worth position—distinguishing
households with net worth above the median and below the median—reveal
that much of this positive effect is driven by the relationship at the bottom
of the distribution (results are not reported but available on request). The
sign of the relationship at the top of the distribution differs across countries
and is only large and significant in Germany (a positive relationship) and
in Portugal (a negative relationship). So, we find a positive relationship
between LTV and wealth inequality in all countries which mostly reflect
the fact that households with higher LTV end up in the lower segments of
the wealth distribution where they tend to push inequality upwards. There
is therefore no obvious indication from these descriptive regressions that
promoting larger LTV would help reducing wealth inequality. This situation
is similar to observing increases in LTV within the light shaded areas in the
plots of Figure 1.
We also observe that the magnitude of estimated coefficients on LTV
tends to be larger in countries with a lower number of households with HMR
mortgages (e.g., in Greece, Italy and Slovakia). The correlation between the
LTV coefficients and the share of households with mortgages across the
twelve countries is –0.47. It is interesting to note that the LTV has a larger
influence on wealth inequality in countries where mortgages are more scarce.
This suggests that a policy seeking to restrict the housing credit, i.e., through
lower LTV caps, may also reduce wealth inequality more significantly in
countries with a more limited mortgages market.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
The model specification of Table 5 adds the financial cost of the mort-
gage. Eight countries keep a positive and significant effect of LTV on wealth
19
inequality. There is no clear result for the effect of financial cost as this is
only statistically significant in four countries. The effect is positive in Ger-
many, Portugal and Italy and negative in the Netherlands.5 For the cases
where LTV and mortgage cost are statistically significant (Germany and
Italy), their coefficients are both positive, i.e. these countries are located in
the light shaded area of Figure 1(a).
The bequest motive is added in the specification of Table 6. LTV is still
significant and positive in eight countries over eleven (Italy does not have
information on bequest motives). The bequest motive has a negative effect
on wealth inequality in Germany, Luxembourg, Malta and Portugal, but a
positive effect in Spain. A negative effect of bequests on wealth inequality
can indicate that the households located in lower and middle sections of the
wealth distribution benefit relatively more from these transfers than richer
households.
INSERT TABLES 5 AND 6 HERE
The price variation of the HMR is added in the model specification in
Table 7. As before, the coefficient of LTV is always positive and this time
it is statistically significant in ten of twelve countries. So, LTV is never
significant in any of the specifications for the Netherlands and Portugal,
the two countries with the largest LTVs in our samples (see Table 1). The
effect of price variation, when significant, is always negative. This occurs in
seven countries. This suggests that house price increases mostly benefited
households in the middle of the distribution.
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
We reiterated estimation using net housing wealth (HMR value minus
mortgage debt) instead of net worth and have not observed changes in the
directions of the effects. The effects of LTV and housing price variation are
only more precisely estimated. We also estimated models using dummies for
LTVs set at [0.6−0.8], [0.8−0.98], [0.98−1.02] and > 1.02 in order to allow
for potential non-linearities. Results are in Tables 8 to 11. Coefficients of
the dummies for LTV ranges increase with the value of LTV, although not
all the dummy coefficients are significant. The largest impacts are obtained
for the largest LTV ranges (above 1). Households with loans larger than the
value of the asset appear to contribute most to wealth inequality.
5We also used annual interest rate instead of the financial cost, but the results are even
less precisely estimated.
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INSERT TABLES 8 TO 11 HERE
5. Concluding remarks
This paper present a simple model that highlights the main trade-offs
and links between the credit market, housing market and household wealth
inequality. In particular, we focus on the effects of LTV caps on wealth
inequality as this is one of the relevant tools at disposal for macroprudential
policy. It is generally acknowledged that LTV caps are able to reduce the
supply of mortgages and prompt a better selection of household risk profiles
by the banks. In the end, it is an important aim to keep prudent levels
of household indebtedness and reduce the risk of crisis. However, policy
makers should be aware that these credit regulations also have effects on
the accumulation of wealth by households and on its distribution. Some
policy makers in Ireland, Finland or Cyprus have recently imposed LTV
regimes with caps depending on the household status (first-time buyer or
not; value of the house).
There is no unequivocal effect of LTV ratios on household wealth inequal-
ity in the model, but we illustrate possible trade-offs between LTV ratios,
loan financial costs, housing prices and bequests. We illustrate this first by
simulations of our theoretical model, and then with household survey data
drawn from HFCS. We employ Gini-RIF regressions to explore the effects
of those variables on wealth inequality.
Results show that, in the sample of households with active mortgages,
households with higher LTV ratios (at the time of acquisition of the prop-
erty) tend to contribute positively to wealth inequality (at present time),
that is, they are in the tails of the wealth distribution—especially the lower
tail. This suggests that easier credit and higher LTV is unlikely to reduce
wealth inequality. On the contrary, house price increases and gifts and inher-
itances tend to contribute negatively to inequality—they appear to benefit
mostly households in the middle of the distribution. Credit costs do not
show a significant role on the distribution of wealth.
Our analysis exposes promising directions for research that incorporates
insights from the income distribution literature into the analysis of macro-
prudential policy, but we cannot emphasize too much that our results are
exploratory by nature. With cross-section data and no means to capture
exogenous variation in LTV ratios in the countries and time period covered
by our data, any causal interpretation is clearly hazardous. It will be inter-
esting to re-examine the effects of macroprudential policy on inequality as
21
additional waves of HFCS data become available and cover a period which
witnessed policy changes over time.
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Table 4: Gini RIF regression coefficients on LTV ratio for net worth inequality
among households aged 25–59
Country
LTV
Gini (Coef/100)/Gini %
Coef s.e. n
Austria 0.125 (0.087) 164 0.771 0.16%
Belgium 0.183*** (0.07) 404 0.613 0.30%
Cyprus 0.128** (0.065) 245 0.691 0.19%
Germany 0.24*** (0.077) 342 0.779 0.31%
Spain 0.197*** (0.073) 756 0.578 0.34%
Greece 0.32*** (0.068) 254 0.559 0.57%
Italy 0.3*** (0.062) 351 0.617 0.49%
Luxembourg 0.232*** (0.069) 235 0.697 0.33%
Malta 0.222*** (0.079) 62 0.615 0.36%
Netherlands 0.145 (0.264) 210 0.691 0.21%
Portugal 0.013 (0.121) 644 0.642 0.02%
Slovakia 0.227** (0.097) 128 0.457 0.50%
*sig. at 10%, **sig. at 5%, ***sig. at 1%. Robust standard errors are in
parenthesis. Each row contains the coefficient of OLS regressions performed
on household Recentered Influence Function (IF) for each country. The RIF
of each household was computed, in a first stage, as the influence of the
household net wealth on the Gini index of net wealth in the country. Other
covariates included in the regressions are sex, age and education level of the
reference person in the household, household gross income and its square,
dummies of year periods for the acquisition of the household main residence.
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Table 5: Gini RIF regression coefficients on LTV ratio and mortgage cost for
net worth inequality among households aged 25–59
Country
LTV ratio Mortgage cost
Gini (Coef/100)/Gini %
Coef s.e. n Coef s.e.
Austria 0.109 (0.097) 155 -0.029 (0.081) 0.771 0.14%
Belgium 0.211*** (0.063) 324 0.093 (0.084) 0.613 0.34%
Cyprus 0.093 (0.069) 186 -0.019 (0.069) 0.691 0.13%
Germany 0.222*** (0.077) 321 0.167* (0.088) 0.779 0.29%
Spain 0.179** (0.081) 751 0.069 (0.059) 0.578 0.31%
Greece 0.337*** (0.068) 250 -0.024 (0.039) 0.559 0.60%
Italy 0.218*** (0.081) 184 0.173** (0.074) 0.617 0.35%
Luxembourg 0.214*** (0.064) 234 0.097 (0.112) 0.697 0.31%
Malta 0.223*** (0.08) 62 0.014 (0.066) 0.615 0.36%
Netherlands -0.08 (0.253) 175 -0.462* (0.249) 0.691 -0.12%
Portugal 0.106 (0.144) 425 0.1*** (0.03) 0.642 0.17%
Slovakia 0.253** (0.107) 107 -0.011 (0.062) 0.457 0.55%
*sig. at 10%, **sig. at 5%, ***sig. at 1%. Robust standard errors are in parenthe-
sis. Each row contains the coefficient of OLS regressions performed on household
Recentered Influence Function (IF) for each country. The RIF of each household
was computed, in a first stage, as the influence of the household net wealth on the
Gini index of net wealth in the country. Other covariates included in the regressions
are sex, age and education level of the reference person in the household, household
gross income and its square, dummies of year periods for the acquisition of the
household main residence.
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Table 6: Gini RIF regression coefficients on LTV ratio and bequest for net
worth inequality among households aged 25–59
Country
LTV ratio Bequest
Gini (Coef/100)/Gini %
Coef s.e. n Coef s.e.
Austria 0.128 (0.085) 164 0.04 (0.097) 0.771 0.17%
Belgium 0.193*** (0.074) 404 0.036 (0.037) 0.613 0.31%
Cyprus 0.112* (0.065) 245 -0.054 (0.037) 0.691 0.16%
Germany 0.187** (0.079) 342 -0.13*** (0.039) 0.779 0.24%
Spain 0.198*** (0.072) 756 0.134* (0.071) 0.578 0.34%
Greece 0.321*** (0.068) 254 0.084 (0.071) 0.559 0.57%
Italy 0.617 0.00%
Luxembourg 0.216*** (0.072) 235 -0.063* (0.038) 0.697 0.31%
Malta 0.215*** (0.076) 62 -0.075** (0.037) 0.615 0.35%
Netherlands 0.118 (0.269) 210 -0.189 (0.128) 0.691 0.17%
Portugal -0.04 (0.136) 644 -0.122** (0.056) 0.642 -0.06%
Slovakia 0.228** (0.097) 128 0.005 (0.066) 0.457 0.50%
*sig. at 10%, **sig. at 5%, ***sig. at 1%. Robust standard errors are in
parenthesis. Each row contains the coefficient of OLS regressions performed on
household Recentered Influence Function (IF) for each country. The RIF of each
household was computed, in a first stage, as the influence of the household net
wealth on the Gini index of net wealth in the country. Other covariates included
in the regressions are sex, age and education level of the reference person in the
household, household gross income and its square, dummies of year periods for
the acquisition of the household main residence.
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Table 7: Gini RIF regression coefficients on LTV ratio and house price variation
for net worth inequality among households aged 25–59
Country
LTV ratio House price ∆
Gini (Coef/100)/gini %
Coef s.e. n Coef s.e.
Austria 0.141* (0.085) 164 -0.16 (0.19) 0.771 0.18%
Belgium 0.19*** (0.07) 404 -0.228* (0.132) 0.613 0.31%
Cyprus 0.154** (0.061) 245 -0.501*** (0.174) 0.691 0.22%
Germany 0.279*** (0.078) 342 -0.732*** (0.227) 0.779 0.36%
Spain 0.218*** (0.075) 756 -0.855** (0.34) 0.578 0.38%
Greece 0.344*** (0.067) 254 -0.989*** (0.271) 0.559 0.62%
Italy 0.307*** (0.06) 351 -0.206 (0.205) 0.617 0.50%
Luxembourg 0.221** (0.087) 235 0.248 (0.689) 0.697 0.32%
Malta 0.272*** (0.084) 62 -1.214*** (0.339) 0.615 0.44%
Netherlands 0.165 (0.271) 210 -1.061 (1.371) 0.691 0.24%
Portugal 0.024 (0.121) 644 -1.338*** (0.435) 0.642 0.04%
Slovakia 0.248** (0.108) 128 -0.158 (0.297) 0.457 0.54%
*sig. at 10%, **sig. at 5%, ***sig. at 1%. Robust standard errors are in parenthe-
sis. Each row contains the coefficient of OLS regressions performed on household
Recentered Influence Function (IF) for each country. The RIF of each household
was computed, in a first stage, as the influence of the household net wealth on the
Gini index of net wealth in the country. Other covariates included in the regressions
are sex, age and education level of the reference person in the household, household
gross income and its square, dummies of year periods for the acquisition of the
household main residence.
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Table 8: Gini RIF regression coefficients on ranges of LTV ratios for net worth
inequality among households aged 25–59
LTV [0.6,0.8[ LTV [0.8,0.98[ LTV [0.98,1.02[ LTV >= 1.02
coeff coeff coeff coeff
Austria 0.027 0.08 0.056 0.045
Belgium 0.053 0.09 0.147** 0.181***
Cyprus 0.103** 0.086* 0.09 0.081
Germany 0.089* 0.111** 0.208** 0.198***
Spain 0.007 -0.023 0.098 0.185***
Greece 0.077* 0.156*** 0.183*** 0.286***
Italy -0.027 0.14*** 0.205*** 0.289***
Luxembourg 0.019 0.092 0.081 0.189***
Malta 0.078 0.091 0.066 0.254***
Netherlands 0.335 0.028 0.074 0.233
Portugal -0.134 -0.13 -0.04 0.092
Slovakia 0.099 0.151** 0.287*** 0.275***
*sig. at 10%, **sig. at 5%, ***sig. at 1%. Robust standard errors are in parenthe-
sis. Each row contains the coefficient of OLS regressions performed on household
Recentered Influence Function (IF) for each country. The RIF of each household
was computed, in a first stage, as the influence of the household net wealth on the
Gini index of net wealth in the country. The reference variable for the LTV dummies
is a dummy variable taking value 1 if LTV < 0.6, and 0 otherwise. Other covariates
included in the regressions are sex, age and education level of the reference person
in the household, household gross income and its square, dummies of year periods
for the acquisition of the household main residence.
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Table 9: Gini RIF regression coefficients on ranges of LTV ratios and mortgage
cost for net worth inequality among households aged 25–59
LTV [0.6,0.8[ LTV [0.8,0.98[ LTV [0.98,1.02[ LTV >= 1.02 financial cost
coeff coeff coeff coeff coeff
Austria 0.022 0.074 0.059 0.033 -0.03
Belgium 0.1 0.113** 0.211** 0.184*** 0.083
Cyprus 0.084 0.087 0.079 0.048 -0.019
Germany 0.096* 0.092* 0.188** 0.193*** 0.161*
Spain 0.014 -0.021 0.098 0.181*** 0.06
Greece 0.088** 0.159*** 0.191*** 0.343*** -0.026
Italy -0.028 0.088 0.151** 0.249*** 0.163**
Luxembourg 0.017 0.073 0.074 0.176*** 0.087
Malta 0.087 0.095 0.044 0.279*** 0.077
Netherlands 0.372 -0.002 0.089 0.071 -0.471*
Portugal -0.101 -0.102 -0.014 0.089 0.101***
Slovakia 0.069 0.193** 0.305*** 0.308*** -0.001
*sig. at 10%, **sig. at 5%, ***sig. at 1%. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Each row contains the
coefficient of OLS regressions performed on household Recentered Influence Function (IF) for each country.
The RIF of each household was computed, in a first stage, as the influence of the household net wealth
on the Gini index of net wealth in the country. The reference variable for the LTV dummies is a dummy
variable taking value 1 if LTV < 0.6, and 0 otherwise. Other covariates included in the regressions are sex,
age and education level of the reference person in the household, household gross income and its square,
dummies of year periods for the acquisition of the household main residence.
Table 10: Gini RIF regression coefficients on ranges of LTV ratios and bequest
for net worth inequality among households aged 25–59
LTV [0.6,0.8[ LTV [0.8,0.98[ LTV [0.98,1.02[ LTV >= 1.02 bequest motive
coeff coeff coeff coeff coeff
Austria 0.025 0.084 0.06 0.054 0.042
Belgium 0.052 0.094 0.153** 0.188*** 0.038
Cyprus 0.102** 0.081* 0.081 0.065 -0.061*
Germany 0.078* 0.085* 0.178** 0.159** -0.131***
Spain 0.004 -0.012 0.11* 0.184*** 0.137*
Greece 0.081* 0.159*** 0.183*** 0.292*** 0.09
Italy
Luxembourg 0.03 0.097 0.067 0.184*** -0.069*
Malta 0.088 0.079 0.093 0.228*** -0.067
Netherlands 0.33 0.026 0.06 0.221 -0.19
Portugal -0.144 -0.139 -0.074 0.062 -0.116**
Slovakia 0.101 0.154** 0.291*** 0.277*** 0.016
*sig. at 10%, **sig. at 5%, ***sig. at 1%. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Each row contains the
coefficient of OLS regressions performed on household Recentered Influence Function (IF) for each country.
The RIF of each household was computed, in a first stage, as the influence of the household net wealth
on the Gini index of net wealth in the country. The reference variable for the LTV dummies is a dummy
variable taking value 1 if LTV < 0.6, and 0 otherwise. Other covariates included in the regressions are sex,
age and education level of the reference person in the household, household gross income and its square,
dummies of year periods for the acquisition of the household main residence.
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Table 11: Gini RIF regression coefficients on ranges of LTV ratios and house
price variation for net worth inequality among households aged 25–59
LTV [0.6,0.8[ LTV [0.8,0.98[ LTV [0.98,1.02[ LTV >= 1.02 price variation
coeff coeff coeff coeff coeff
Austria 0.033 0.083 0.059 0.061 -0.124
Belgium 0.05 0.09 0.148** 0.186*** -0.228*
Cyprus 0.089* 0.091** 0.109 0.09 -0.456**
Germany 0.09* 0.133*** 0.216*** 0.241*** -0.731***
Spain 0.029 -0.008 0.102* 0.21*** -0.835**
Greece 0.093** 0.167*** 0.194*** 0.311*** -0.976***
Italy -0.025 0.139*** 0.207*** 0.293*** -0.175
Luxembourg 0.017 0.088 0.077 0.179** 0.19
Malta 0.08 0.106* 0.096 0.311*** -1.274***
Netherlands 0.335 0.021 0.076 0.23 -0.982
Portugal -0.138 -0.13 -0.038 0.087 -1.338***
Slovakia 0.093 0.153** 0.298*** 0.303*** -0.208
*sig. at 10%, **sig. at 5%, ***sig. at 1%. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Each row contains the
coefficient of OLS regressions performed on household Recentered Influence Function (IF) for each country.
The RIF of each household was computed, in a first stage, as the influence of the household net wealth
on the Gini index of net wealth in the country. The reference variable for the LTV dummies is a dummy
variable taking value 1 if LTV < 0.6, and 0 otherwise. Other covariates included in the regressions are sex,
age and education level of the reference person in the household, household gross income and its square,
dummies of year periods for the acquisition of the household main residence.
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(a) Effects on inequality by LTV ratio and mortgage cost.
All the combinations of LTV ratios and mortgage falling on
the darker (lighter) area indicate a negative (positive) effect
of LTV ratio on inequality (with β=0.90; γ=0.90)
(b) Effects on inequality by LTV ratio and bequest motive.
All the combinations of LTV ratios and the strength of the
bequest motive falling on the darker (lighter) area indicate
a negative (positive) effect of LTV ratio on inequality (with
β=0.90; r=0.70)
Figure 1: Effects of LTV ratio changes (θ) on within inequality (Iw)
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